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1 Introduction
In many network industries like telecommunication, electricity gas, etc., the
ongoing liberalization process has spurred an intense debate on the phe-
nomenon of “downstream access”. Accordingly this subject has been ex-
tensively studied in the economic literature.1 In the postal sector the issue
of “access” has been relevant long before the debate on liberalization was
launched. However, it has appeared under a different form namely, the phe-
nomenon of worksharing. Processing workshared mail at a discounted rate
is effectively like providing the client with access to one or several segments
of the postal network. Like in the case of downstream access, we have a
situation where the postal operator sells some products which use only part
of its network, while other products use the entire network. Put differently,
the postal sector has the specific feature that access is a relevant issue even
when there are no competing operators in the market. This is reflected in
the existing literature on worksharing which typically considers a monopo-
listic sector; see Billette de Villemeur et al. (2002, 2003).2 The structure
of prices derived in this literature has to be reconsidered when the market
opens. This problem arises for two reasons. First, there is the standard
problem that pricing rules under (perfect or imperfect) competition typi-
cally differ from those under monopoly. Second, once entry has occurred,
the demand for workshared mail may in part emanate from the competing
operators.
The regulatory design of postal prices including those for workshared
mail is essentially a Ramsey-Boiteux pricing problem. The underlying is-
sues are very simple. The incumbent operator offers different products to
different types of customers and we can think of workshared mail as one
of these products. While some of these products are final goods, some
like worhshared mail may be intermediate goods which are used as inputs
1See for instance Laffont and Tirole (1996, 2000) and Armstrong (2002).
2See also Panzar (2002), Mitchel (1999) and Sherman (2001).
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by other firms. The pricing of this intermediate good then indirectly de-
termines the prices paid by the final consumers of these products. In a
“perfect” (first-best) world the pricing rules for all these products are very
simple. We know from microeconomic economic theory that the appropriate
rule is simply (long-run) marginal cost for all products. This provides con-
sumers with the correct signals and ensures that the decentralized outcome
is efficient.
In an industry like the postal sector, where technology involves “fixed”
costs (like the cost of maintaining the delivery network) it is however, typi-
cally the case that marginal cost (even long-run marginal costs) are well be-
low average costs.3 Strict marginal cost pricing is then problematic because
it implies that the operator cannot break even, which is usually considered
as not acceptable for a number of reasons (including political economy con-
siderations).4 Consequently, one would have to impose positive markups on
at least some products in order to meet the break-even constraint. The de-
termination of these markups is precisely what the Ramsey-Boiteux problem
is all about. The question is simply how to distort the different prices away
from marginal cost in order to break-even while keeping the efficiency cost of
these distortions as small as possible. The exact specification of this problem
and hence the specific results depend on the characteristics of the industry
(costs, technology and demand) the general regulatory environment (e.g.,
the presence of a uniform pricing constraint) and on the type of competi-
tion there is between the incumbent and the entrant(s) (competitive fringe,
monopolistic competition, some form of oligopoly, etc.). The literature so
far has concentrated on the competitive fringe case for which a number of
interesting results have been obtained.5 Pricing rules for final goods and for
3Like most of the regulation literature we use the term fixed cost for the part of cost
which is independant of output, even in the long run.
4 In a first-best setting this problem can be overcome by a lump-sum tranfer to the
operator covering its fixed cost.
5See e.g., Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003), Cremer et al. (1995, 1997), Crew and
Kleindorfer (2002), De Donder et al. (2002, 2003).
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workshared mail are typically inverse-elasticity rules, properly amended to
account for cross-price effects (if any). Consequently, optimal prices depend
on demand consideration and not just on cost considerations. This is dif-
ferent from the first best setting where prices simply reflect marginal costs.
This analysis has to be completed with studies of imperfect competition set-
tings. This is an ambitious research program. In the current paper we aim
at taking a step in that direction by considering a fully fledged model of a
differentiated oligopoly where operators interact strategically. Our findings
suggest that while the specific results have to be amended, many of the
general principles governing pricing in competitive fringe settings remain
applicable under imperfect competition.
Summing up, it appears that the economists’ toolbox regarding pricing
in the postal sector, though still in need to be expanded, does already have
the potential to offer valuable guidance in the regulatory debate. In many
instances, however, all these studies are ignored by the various parties in-
volved, regulators and postal representatives alike. Instead, the debate con-
centrates on the relative merits of two essentially ad hoc rules (or classes of
rules). The first of these ad hoc approaches is the so called Efficient Compo-
nent Pricing Rule (ECPR) which (roughly speaking) consists in applying the
same (per unit) markup on workshared that is applied on the corresponding
final product offered by the incumbent operator. Consequently, worksharing
per se does not appear to affect the incumbent’s profits and more generally
its ability to cover its fixed costs. This rule has the theoretical merit that
it leads (under some conditions) to efficient entry decisions: entry occurs if
and only if the entrant is more efficient. However, these apparent properties
often do not stand under closer scrutiny. Further, the rule is incomplete and
does not explain how the markup on the incumbent’s relevant final product
ought to be determined. In addition and most significantly, it does not in
general yield an efficient Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, even when one ignores the
determination of all the other prices.
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Another ad hoc rule which is sometimes advocated by regulators (for
instance in the UK) is a simple “cost-plus” rule, where the access price is
obtained from the long run marginal cost by applying some ad hoc markup.
This may at first sound similar to a Ramsey-Boiteux approach and there
exists of course a specific level of the markup for which we obtain the Ramsey
price (or alternatively the ECPR level). The crucial difference, however, is
that no effort in made to optimize the markup by accounting for instance
for demand considerations. Instead the markup is set in a ad hoc way. For
instance a small markup is added in order to cover the cost of universal
service which in turn is calculated in a questionable way (and thus often
significantly underestimated; see Cremer et al. (2000)). There is no reason
to expect that such a procedure can yield anything which comes close to the
optimal prices.
A fully fledged model of postal sector pricing would have to account for
both the clients and the competitors demand for workshared mail. This is,
however, a rather ambitious endeavor which will occupy our research agenda
in the near future (and maybe beyond). We proceed with this project by
addressing the problems one at a time. In this paper we continue our quest
for simple and intuitive but yet theoretically founded optimal pricing rules.
Like in our earlier papers Billette de Villemeur et al. (2002, 2003a, 2003b)
we adopt a deliberately simple and stylized setting to focus on what we
consider the essential feature of the postal sector (in particular with regard
to cost and demand). Here we focus on the ramifications brought about
by imperfect competition in a setting where all the demand for workshared
mail emanates from competitors (rather than the clients). To make this
clear and to distinguish this paper from our earlier paper where workshared
mail was demanded solely by clients we shall refer to the price charged for
workshared mail as “access price”.
The main features of our setting are as follows. There are two types of
operators: the incumbent universal service operator on the one hand and the
4
potential entrants on the other hand. There are two postal products: single
piece mail and bulk or “commercial” mail. Single piece mail is offered solely
by the incumbent operator, at a uniform price. Entry, if any, thus occurs in
the market for commercial mail. In this market there is one representative
sender and two types of addressees: residents of low cost (urban) areas and
residents of high cost (rural) areas.
The incumbent uses the same delivery network to process both types of
mail. There is a fixed cost associated with maintaining the delivery network
in any given area. Fixed costs per addressee are higher in the rural than in
the urban area. In addition, delivery (of any type of mail) involves an identi-
cal and constant marginal cost. Entrants have their own delivery network in
the urban area. The fixed cost of setting up a delivery network in the rural
area, on the other hand, may or may not be prohibitive. In this paper we
assume that it is prohibitive so that entrants are able to accept mail to rural
addressees only if they can gain access to the incumbent’s delivery network.
Access is always possible at the commercial mail rate charged to the incum-
bent’s clients (which in turn cannot exceed its single piece rate). However,
the entrant may also be able to access the network by buying workshared
mail from the incumbent operator at a discounted price.
We study the determination of optimal (regulated) prices under the
assumptions that the commercial mail market consists of a differentiated
duopoly in which the incumbent and an entrant compete. We consider an
asymmetric (sequential) setting in which the incumbent (or alternatively
the regulating authority) acts as a Stackelberg leader. We concentrate on
cases where the regulator sets all of the incumbent’s prices at their optimal
level but settings where some prices are given and/or determined competi-
tively are also discussed. Furthermore, upon entry, the incumbent’s uniform
pricing constraint may or may not continue to extend to the commercial
mail market. This latter feature allows us to pinpoint the impact of uni-
form pricing on pricing rules. In either of these settings, we first derive the
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pricing rules under general demand functions and then consider two special
cases for illustrative purposes. The special cases are obtained by making
extreme assumptions about the degree of substitutability between the en-
trant’s and the incumbent products: perfect substitutes on the one hand
and independent demands on the other hand.
2 Model
As far as preferences and technologies are concerned, we continue to use the
specification considered by Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003). Much of this
section is thus drawn from that paper. This is done to make the current
paper self-contained and to avoid cumbersome cross referencing.
2.1 Products, preferences and demand
There are two postal products: single piece mail, X, and commercial mail,
Y. Single-piece mail is supplied by a single operator, namely the incumbent,
I, at a uniform price pX . The net surplus generated by this product is given
by
U(X)− pXX. (1)
The aggregate demand function, obtained by maximizing (1) is denoted
X(pX).
There are two operators in the market for Y : the incumbent I and an
entrant E. There is one representative sender who sends commercial mail to
N addressees. A fraction α of these addressees is located in area u (urban)
while the remaining fraction (1 − α) is located in r (rural). Utility (net
surplus) of the representative sender is given by:6
αNv(yuI , y
u
E) + (1− α)Nv(yrI , yrE)− αNpuI yuI − αNpuEyuE
− (1− α)NprIyrI − (1− α)NprEyrE , (2)
6The specification of preferences is inspired by Cremer et al. (2001).
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yjk ≥ 0 is the number of units sent to each addressee in area j = u, r through
operator k = I, E, while pjk is the price for y of operator k = I, E for a
unit sent to an addressee located in area j = u, r. We consider two cases
depending on whether or not operator I faces a uniform pricing constraint
requiring puI = p
r
I . The function v(·, ·) represents utility per addressee or,
more precisely, the contribution of an addressee to the sender’s utility. Ob-
serve that the specification of v reflects the degree of substitutability of
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s products. The extreme case of perfect
substitutes obtains when utility depends only on yjI+ y
j
E .
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E) = (1− α)NyrI(prI , prE) Y rE(prI , prE) = (1− α)NyrE(prI , prE).
There is also the implicit constraint that pjI ≤ pX . Clearly, the price of
commercial mail (in any area) cannot exceed the single piece rate. To limit
the number of cases to be considered, we shall assume that this constraint
is not binding.
2.2 Cost, profits and welfare
The stylized postal network we consider consists of two segments. Segment
2 corresponds to a composite activity including collecting, sorting and trans-
portation. This activity implies a constant marginal cost of c2. Segment 1 is
delivery with marginal cost of c1. These marginal costs are the same for all
operators and they are independent of the location of the addressee. How-
ever, there is also a fixed cost associated with the delivery network which
differs across areas and operators. Single piece mail uses both segments of
the network while commercial mail only uses the delivery network. Oper-
ator I ’s delivery network extends to both areas; it is used to deliver the
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two types of mail. Operator E, on the other hand, may have part (or all)
of its mail in a given area delivered through operator I. Let Zj denote the
quantity of operator E’s mail which is delivered by I in area j. We have
0 ≤ Zj ≤ Y jE .
The corresponding access charge is aj ≤ pjI . It cannot exceed the operators
price (for commercial mail) in that area, which in turn can of course not
exceed the single piece rate.
The cost structure is represented by the following cost function for op-
erator I :





u + Zr) + αNFu + (1− α)NF r + F,
where Fu et F r are the fixed costs per addressee of the delivery network in
the urban and in the rural area, with F r > Fu > 0, while F ≥ 0 includes all
the remaining fixed costs (including common costs). The profit of operator
I is then given by









rZr + auZu − CI . (3)
Turning to operator E, let f j denote the fixed delivery network cost
(per addressee) in area j = u, r, with fr > fu ≥ 0. This fixed cost is only
incurred when Y jE > Z
j that is, when operator E does not deliver all its
mail in the area (if any) by accessing I’s network. In the main part of the
paper, we shall assume that f r is prohibitive so that Zr = Y rE . In other
words, the entrant will never find it optimal to set up a delivery network in
area r.
In the urban area, the linearity of the cost structure implies that we have
either Zu = 0 or Zu = Y uE . We shall for simplicity concentrate on the case
where Zu = 0. The other case can, however, be easily accommodated. We
then obtain the following cost function for operator E.












E −CE . (4)
Finally, welfare is measured by (unweighted) total surplus i.e., the sum
of consumer surplus and profits
W = U(X)− pXX + αNv(yuI , yuE) + (1− α)Nv(yrI , yrE)
− αNpuI yuI − αNpuI yuI − (1− α)NprIyrI − (1− α)NprEyrE
+ πE + πI (5)
Observe that decision variables are prices, so that all the quantities in (5)
are given by the corresponding demand functions.
So far we have not specified how the prices of the entrant will be deter-
mined. It is clear that they will somehow depend on the incumbent’s prices
and particularly on the access charge. However, the specific relationship
will depend on the entry scenario which is considered. Billette de Villemeur
et al. (2003) have considered the case of a competitive fringe, which is the
setting on which most of the access pricing literature has concentrated. The
main advantage of this approach is its simplicity. With the entrant pricing
at marginal cost, the impact of the incumbent’s pricing strategy on the en-
trant is easily assessed. The main drawback is that competitive behavior is
not consistent with the presence of a positive fixed cost: when prices simply
reflect the (constant) marginal cost, the entrant will make a loss equal to
the fixed costs and will thus not be viable. In the current paper we allow the
entrant to have some market power in the sense that it can realize a markup
over its marginal cost. This market power is, however, limited in that we
consider a Stackelberg type game in which the incumbent plays a leading
role in that it can commit to its pricing policy. We shall study the solution
without and with a uniform pricing constraint imposed on the incumbent.
Most of the formal derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
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2.3 The entrant’s pricing strategy
We assume that the entrant maximizes its profits given the incumbent’s
prices puI , p
r
I and given the access charge a







E − c1)Y uE (puI , puE) + (prE − ar)Y rE(prI , prE)− αNfu. (6)
The FOC for profit maximization are:























These pricing functions are a crucial ingredient of our problem. They rep-
resent the major channel through which imperfect competition affects the
formal analysis. To see this recall that under (perfectly) competitive behav-
ior the relevant pricing rules are given by:7
puE = c1, (11)
prE = a
r. (12)
Consequently, with perfect competition, puE is not affected by the incum-
bent’s pricing behavior, while prE is solely determined by the access price,
with dprE/da
r = 1. In other words, any variation in the access charge is
entirely shifted to the final consumer.
With imperfect competition and pricing rules (9)—(10), on the other
hand, the incumbent’s prices do directly affect the entrant’s prices. Without
further restrictions on demand, the comparative statics of these pricing rules
7See Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003).
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are ambiguous. We shall assume dpuE/dp
u




I > 0 which
can be considered as the “normal case” which arises under some additional
conditions; see the Appendix A.1. For instance, these conditions are satisfied
for linear demand functions. As to the impact of the access charge, we have
(in general) ∂prE/∂a
r 6= 1. For instance, a linear demand curve implies
∂prE/∂a
r = 1/2; again, see the Appendix A.1. However, ∂prE/∂a
r > 1 (more
than complete shifting) is also possible.8 Note also the separability: the
entrant’s price in any area (r or u) do not depend on the incumbent’s prices
in the other area. For future reference note that (9)—(10) always imply
puE ≥ c1 and prE ≥ ar. As can be shown very easily, it is never optimal for
the entrant to set any of its prices below marginal cost.9
Before proceeding, let us observe that rather than adopting a fully
fledged setting of strategic interaction we could have adopted an intermedi-
ate approach by assuming
puE = c1(1 + η
u), (13)
prE = a
r(1 + ηr), (14)
where ηu and ηr are positive constants. In other words, with these pricing
rules the entrant simply applies constant markups (1 + ηu) and (1 + ηr) to
its marginal costs in the two areas. These kind of pricing rules are often
considered in monopolistic competition models (see Tirole 1988). They are
of course simply special case of our rules (9)—(10). To avoid repetitions,
we have decided not to consider this special case separately. While these
alternative pricing rules yield a simpler problem, the simplification is not
significant enough to justify a detailed analysis.
To simplify notation in the remainder of the paper, it is convenient to
8This is a standart result from tax incidence theory. In particular, it is well known that
when demand elasticity and marginal costs are constant we necessarily have ∂prE/∂a
r > 1;
see
9This property relies on the separability of demand between u and r and on the one
shot specification of the game. In a dynamic setting this would no longer be necessarily
be true in all periods.
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redefine the demand functions to account for the reaction of the entrant:
eY uI (puI ) = Y uI [puI , puE(puI )] eY uE (puI ) = Y uE [puI , puE(puI )]eY rI (prI , ar) = Y rI [prI , prE(ar, prI)] eY rE(prI , ar) = Y rE[prI , prE(ar, prI)]. (15)
The properties of these redefined demand functions are presented in the
Appendix A.2.
2.4 The optimal pricing problem
Substituting (3), (4), (9) and (10) in (5), while imposing the constraints
πI ≥ 0 and ar ≤ prI yields to the following Lagrangian expression for the
optimal pricing problem:
Γ = U(X)− pXX + αNv(yuI , yuE) + (1− α)Nv(yrI , yrE)
− αNpuI yuI − αNpuEyuE − (1− α)NprIyrI − (1− α)NprEyrE
+ (puE − c1)Y uE + (prE − ar)Y rE − αNfu










− (1 + λ)[(c1 + c2)X + c1(Y uI + Y rI + Y rE)]
− (1 + λ)[αNFu + (1− α)NF r + F ]
− µ(ar − prI) (16)
where λ > 0 is the multiplier of the (incumbent) operator’s break-even con-
straint, while µ ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the constraint that the access price
cannot exceed operator I’s price in the relevant market. When µ > 0 the
constraint is binding and ar = prI (Regime II below) while µ = 0 corresponds
to the case where the constraint is not binding (Regime I). The decision
variables are pX , puI , p
r
I and a
r. The entrant’s prices are then determined
according to (9)—(10) and demand levels are specified by (15). When there
is no uniform pricing constraint, puI and p
r
I can be set independently. When
the incumbent is subject to a uniform pricing requirement, the constraint
puI = p
r
I has to be added and we effectively have only three instruments,





3 No uniform-pricing constraint
The constraint ar ≤ prI may or may not be binding. Accordingly, there are
two possible regimes with µ = 0 or µ > 0.
3.1 General demand functions
3.1.1 Regime I: ar ≤ prI not binding (µ = 0).
As shown in the Appendix, differentiating Γ with respect to the instruments
and combining and rearranging the first-order conditions, yields the follow-
ing optimal pricing rules for this case:






































where εX and σY uI are (absolute values of) “ordinary” price elasticities of















Furthermore, bσY rI Y rE and bσY rEY rI are the superelasticities of eY rI and eY rE re-
spectively; see below for further details.
We shall now have a closer look at this expressions by considering the
different markets separately. Doing this we shall focus on the impact of im-
perfect competition. In other words we examine how these expression differ
from their counterparts in the competitive fringe case (namely expressions
10Troughout the paper ε is used for elasticities (or superelasticities) defined on the basis
of the original demand functions. The notation σ, on the other hand, is used for elasticities
(or superelasticities) defined on the basis of the redefined demand functions eY (specified
by (15)) which account for the induced adjustments of the entrant’s prices.
13
(8)—(11) in Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003)). Observe that the pricing
rule in for single piece mail X is not affected by the presence of imperfect
competition in the market for Y .11 We continue to have a simple Ramsey-
type inverse elasticity rule. This separability also implies that the rest of he
analysis is not affected if we assume that the price of X is exogenously given
and cannot be adjusted upon entry.12 Let us now turn to the two segments
in the market for Y .
Rural area The most obvious impact of imperfect competition is the
presence of an additional term in the access-pricing formula (20), namely the
second term on the RHS. This term is negative when prE > a
r, it vanishes
when prE = a
r in which case we return to the competitive fringe case. This
term thus tends to reduce the access charge. This is because under imperfect
competition the price of the entrant is set above marginal cost and is thus
too high from an efficiency perspective. Reducing the access charge is then
a way to reduce the entrants price and mitigate the inefficiency implied by
imperfect competition. This reduction in the access charge implies of course
also a cost in that it reduces revenue and thus makes budged balance harder
to achieve (some other price has to be increased which brings about other
efficiency losses). The optimal pricing rule strikes a balance between these
two effects. The revenue considerations are formally reflected by the pres-
ence of λ in the denominator of the term. The smaller is λ, the larger will be
the imperfect competition adjustment is access charge. This becomes most
apparent when we look at the extreme cases. When λ = 0 (20) simplifies to
ar − c1 = −(prE − ar) ≤ 0 (22)
so that the access charge is set below marginal cost (of access). Put dif-
ferently the entrant is subsidized. Further simplifying (22) yields prE − ar
11The optimal price level will, however, in general be different because the value of λ
will change
12As long as the constraint that pjI ≤ pX is not violated.
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indicating that this subsidy is set to induce the entrant to price at marginal
cost. At the other extreme when λ → ∞ the imperfect competition term
vanishes altogether. Any reduction in the access charge would be too costly.
The structure of the first terms in both (19) and (20) is not affected by
the presence of imperfect competition. Like in the competitive fringe these
are simply inverse superplasticity term, where the “super” comes in because
the cross price effects. Recall that the demand functions of the two operators
are not independent. The specific definition of the superelasticity is different,
though. This is because demand levels are given by the redefined demand
functions eY rI (prI , ar) and eY rE(prI , ar) which do take the induced impact on
operator E’s prices into account. As shown in the Appendix, we then obtain
de generalization of the usual definition of superelasticities.
Urban area We now turn to the pricing rule for the urban market,
namely (18). The second term on the RHS of this expression is an imperfect
competition term; it vanishes in the competitive fringe case (when puE =
c1). With puE − c1 > 0, assuming ∂ eY uE/∂puI > 0 and ∂ eY uI /∂puI < 0, this
term is positive and thus tends to increase the incumbent’s price in the
urban area. The intuition behind this property is once again related to
the inefficiencies implied by imperfect competition. When the entrant’s
price is above marginal cost, its output lower than the efficient level. When
goods are “substitutes” (∂ eY uE/∂puI > 0) increasing the incumbent’s price
then brings about an extra benefit, namely that it increases the entrant’s
output.13 It does, however, also decrease the incumbent’s output (as long as
∂ eY uI /∂puI < 0) which in turn is inefficient. The second term in the pricing
rule strikes a balance between these two effects.
The first term on the RHS of (18) is the Ramsey term, which has, once
again the same structure as in the competitive fringe case. However, it is
13The definition of “substitutes” underlying this statement is not standard for it relies
on the derivative of eY rather than of Y . See Appendix A.2 for a study of the properties
of eY .
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≤ εY uI .
Consequently when the reaction of the entrant is accounted for, the incum-
bent’s demand is less elastic than when the entrants price is held fixed. This
is because when puI increases, the price of the substitute offered by the en-
trant puE will also increase which in turn will mitigate the decrease in the
incumbent’s demand.
The solution discussed so far is valid when it yields a level of the access
charge that does not exceed the incumbent’s price level. From the pricing
rules we see that this is the case when
λ
1 + λ






1bσY rI Y rE . (23)
A sufficient condition for (23) is bσY rI Y rE ≤ bσY rEY rI , that is when the superelas-
ticity of the incumbent’s demand is smaller than the superelasticity of the
entrant’s demand.14 Observe that it is the superelasticities (of the appro-
priately defined demand functions) rather than the elasticities per se which
must be ranked properly. When the solution described by (17)—(20) does
not automatically satisfy ar ≤ prI , this constraint will be binding and we will
have Regime II.
3.1.2 Regime II: ar ≤ prI binding (µ > 0)
With ar = prI ≡ pr the two first-order conditions with respect to these
variables are replaced by a single one, which is the sum of the two separate






































14Where demand levels are once again defined by eY rI (prI , ar) and eY rE(prI , ar).
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In this expression, the “total elasticity” σY r is defined by
σY r =
prI




































σY rE − σY rEY rI
¢
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We use the term “total” to reflect the property that when pr = ar
changes, the two arguments of the demand functions eY rI (prI , ar) and eY rE(prI , ar)
follow the exact same change. Observe that the pricing rules for pX and puI
are unchanged and continue to be given by (17) and (18).
To interpret the pricing rule (24) let us compare it to (20), its counter-
parts in Regime I. The first notable difference is that we return to a simple
inverse elasticity rule. There are no superelasticities in the expression any-
more because there are no cross price effects per se. To be more precise, the
cross price effects disappear through the aggregation of Y rI and Y
r
E which
are now sold at the same price.15 The second difference lies in the imperfect
competition term which has now a slightly more complex structure. Specifi-
cally there is an additional multiplicative term which measures the variation
in the incumbent’s demand relative to the variation of total demand (in the
rural segment).
15The aggregation is legitimate because the two products have the same marginal de-
livery costs. This is not particularly restrictive here because delivery occurs though I’s
network in any case. Demand functions for the two products are of course different, but
this does not prevent us from aggregating their demand.
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3.2 Specific demand functions: benchmark cases
Our results so far depend crucially on demand elasticities (and superelastic-
ities), which in turn depend on the degree of product differentiation between
the entrant’s and the incumbent’s product. For instance, the incumbent’s
demand will tend to be more elastic when operator E’s products are close
substitutes to operators I’s products. To understand the impact of the de-
gree of substitutability on the structure of prices and, in particular on access
charges Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003) have considered two extreme spe-
cial cases within the competitive fringe framework. The first one obtains
when the incumbent and the entrants products are perfect (and one for one)
substitutes while the second one occurs when demands are independent. In
the current setting of imperfect competition, the degree of substitution be-
tween products will have an even more complex impact on the results. This
is because under imperfect competition, the pricing strategies of the entrant
(9) and (10) are also affected (implicitly) by substitution and by the degree
of product differentiation. To see this observe first that when the prod-
ucts are perfect substitutes, we are in a homogenous Bertrand setting where
equilibrium prices have to equal marginal costs. Formally, pricing strategies
are then given by (12) and (11) and we essentially return to the competi-
tive fringe case. To make this paper self-contained, let us briefly review the
major results obtained for that case.
3.2.1 Perfect substitutes
The case of perfect one by one substitutes is obtained by assuming that the
utility of the representative consumer is given by:
αNv(yuI + y
u
E) + (1− α)Nv(yrI + yrE)− αNpuI yuI − αNpuI yuI
− (1− α)NprIyrI − (1− α)NprEyrE, (25)
which is a special case of (2). In this case demand behavior is “extreme”
in the sense that the consumer only buys the cheapest product. Interior
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solutions can only arise when the two operators charge the same price. As
in the general case, we assume for the time being that there is no uniform
pricing constraint.
To determine the pricing rules, first observe that in the rural market we
must have either puI = p
u




E = c1 with Y
u
I = 0. With perfect
substitutes operator I can only have a positive market share when its price
does not exceed that of operator E. Either way, no profit (contribution
towards fixed costs) can be generated in that market.16 Second, in the rural
area, we must have Regime II with ar = prI .
17 Per our above results, the
solution is then given by expressions (17) and (24):



















where it should be recalled that εY r is the total elasticity of Y r = Y rI +
Y rE . Observe that with perfect substitutes, we return to “regular” demand
elasticities and we have σY r = εY r . Furthermore, with prE = a
r the imperfect
competition term in (24) vanishes. We thus have simple Ramsey problem
over two prices: pX (single piece mail) and prI = a
r(commercial mail price
and access charge in area r). The other price puI is given and the operator
has no positive markup on that market. In other words, only single piece
mail and rural commercial mail contribute towards the fixed costs. And how
the cost coverage translates into markups depends on demand elasticities.
16Setting puI < p
u
E = c1 yields negative profits and is even worse.
17To see this, observe that ar < prI implies that operator I’s market share is zero. This
in turn can never be optimal, as long as λ > 0. Consequently, we must have ar = prI .
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3.2.2 Independent demands
The case of independent demand functions (no cross-price effects) is obtained
by assuming that the utility of the representative consumer is given by:
αN [vI(y
u
I ) + vE(y
u
E)] + (1− α)N [vI(yrI) + vE(yrE)]− αNpuI yuI − αNpuI yuI
− (1− α)NprIyrI − (1− α)NprEyrE, (28)
which is again a special case of (2).18 This amounts to assuming that the
entrant offers a different product which “creates its own demand” in the
sense that its existing demand (for the incumbent’s product) is not affected.








In words, the entrants price do not depend on the incumbent’s (final goods)
prices. This is like in the competitive fringe setting. However, one has to
keep in mind that (the entrant’s) prices are not equal to marginal costs here.
The solution under Regime I , which was given by expression (18), (19)




















































Simplifications arise because absent of cross-price effects, super-elasticities
reduce to ordinary price elasticities and the distinction between eY jk and Y jk






E), j = u, r.
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becomes irrelevant. Consequently, we return to a standard Ramsey problem
with simple inverse elasticity rules for the urban segment and for the final
product in the rural market. Observe that the imperfect competition term
in the urban segment has vanished because with independent demand func-
tions we have ∂ eY uE/∂puI = 0. The imperfect competition distortion in the
urban segment (associated with puE > c1) continues to exist, but it is now
independent of the incumbent’s prices. The imperfect competition term in
access charge rule, however continues to be present in (31) and tends to
decrease the access charge.
Finally note that σY rE > εY rI is a sufficient condition for Regime I to
prevail. The interpretation of this condition is, however, now more complex
than that of is counterpart in the competitive fringe case; see Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003).
3.2.3 From specific cases to the general setting: main lessons
The results obtained for these special cases are very interesting. They sug-
gest that the difference between the incumbent’s price and the access charge
decreases with the degree of substitutability between the two operators’
products. When there is no substitution, cross price effects and hence com-
petition essentially play no role. The entrant’s product is treated like an
entirely different good whose consumers contribute to the incumbent’s fixed
costs (through the implicit tax on access) on the basis of a simple inverse
elasticity rule (and Regime I prevails). When goods become substitutes,
pricing rules have to account for the impact of access charges on the in-
cumbent demand (via the entrant’s price). This effect will tend to increase
access charges. At the extreme case of perfect substitutes, the cross-price
effects are so significant that access at a rate which is lower than the price
would effectively reduce the incumbent’s market share to zero (and Regime
II prevails).
The benchmark cases are also interesting when it come to assess the wel-
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fare implications of entry and/or the provision of access. Recall that for the
general case the welfare impact of entry is ambiguous in this model. On the
benefit side, a new product variety is offered to consumers. On the cost side,
there is the distortion associated with imperfect competition and the fact
that the incumbent’s budget constraint (which has a positive shadow price)
will be harder to satisfy (this leads to more distortions and lower welfare).
When the entrant’s technology involves a fixed cost, this duplication of fixed
costs introduces an additional negative effect. The interesting feature is that
for the special cases we can assess the welfare impact.
Consider first the independent demand case. There it is plain that entry
can only be welfare enhancing. To see this observe that with independent
demands, the monopoly policy for the incumbent remains feasible after en-
try. The entrant “creates” its own demand and this will generate additional
surplus (as long as the entrant manages to break even). Because the entrant
prices above marginal cost, this additional surplus is not as large as it could
be.19 This mitigates the positive impact of entry but it will not eliminate it
altogether.
The perfect substitute case gives exactly the opposite conclusion. Here
entry does not add anything (the product is exactly the same as the in-
cumbent’s). However, its presence complicates budget balancing for the
incumbent and thus exacerbates distortions. Put differently, whatever so-
lution is feasible with entry is feasible also under monopoly (but at lower
cost). Imperfect competition, on the other hand, is irrelevant in this case.
With homogenous products, the entrant’s prices are set exactly like in the
competitive fringe case.
Extrapolating from these special cases we can then conjecture (by con-
tinuity) that whenever the goods are close substitutes entry necessarily re-
duces welfare. Or, in other words, demands must be sufficiently independent
for a welfare improvement to be possible. Yet another way to phrase this
19 If the entrant were to price at marginal cost.
22
is that the entrant’s product must create a sufficient amount of additional
demand (and hence additional surplus).
4 Uniform pricing constraint
We now turn to the case where operator I is subject to a (geographically)
uniform pricing constraint which requires puI = p
r
I = pI . We have two
possible regimes.
4.1 Regime I: ar ≤ prI not binding (µ = 0).
We now have to differentiate Γ with respect to pX , pI and ar. The pricing
rule for single piece mail does not change and the expression for pX continues
to be given by (17). Turning to the commercial mail market, rearranging
the first-order conditions and defining YI = Y uI +Y
r


































where bσYIY rE and bσY rEYI are the superelasticities of eYI and eY rE respectively
(See appendix A.4).
It thus appears that in our setting the uniform pricing constraint does
not change the general form of the access pricing rules. We continue to have
an inverse (super)elasticity rules, with an imperfect competition term for
the access charge. Further, the definitions of superelasticities (given in the
Appendix A.4) are exactly the same as in Section 3. Comparing (33) and
(20) reveals that the access pricing rules differ in the “scope” of the second
product with which cross-price effects are accounted for. Formally, we now
have bσY rEYI rather than bσY rEY rI so that with uniform pricing constraint the
second product relevant for the superelasticity includes delivery in urban as
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well as in rural areas. Without uniform pricing constraint, only the rural
segment of the market was relevant.
The next interesting step would be to compare bσY rEYI and bσY rEY rI , for this
would give us the impact of the uniform pricing constraint on the access
charge (at least for a given level of λ). At this point we can only concede
that the comparison appears to be ambiguous, but we have no conclusive
evidence yet that both cases can effectively arise.
Finally, the pricing rule for the incumbent’s (final) product becomes
more complex under the uniform pricing constraint. This is because the
incumbent’s price now pertains to two markets so that (32) combines the
effects which were captured separately by (18) and (19).
4.2 Regime II: ar ≤ prI binding ( µ > 0)
The solution we have just discussed is valid only when it implies ar ≤ prI =
pI . Otherwise, the constraint will be binding and we will have Regime II
with ar = pI = prI = p
u
I . We are then effectively left with only two instru-





















where σY is the “total” elasticity of the aggregate good eY = eY uI + eY rI + eY rE.
Consequently, like its counterpart in the non uniform pricing case (Section
3), Regime II yields an inverse elasticity pricing rules which also includes
an imperfect competition term.
To study the impact of uniform pricing on access charge we have to
compare (34) with (24). For a given level of λ this amounts to comparing
first of all σY and σY r . Recalling that eY r = eY rI + eY rE so that eY = eY uI + eY r,
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it is plausible to assume that eY has a more elastic demand then eY r.20
This is because eY r covers the entire demand in the rural area whileeY uI
covers only the incumbent’s market share. Recall that the entrant offers
a substitute to the incumbent’s product in area u which is priced at c1.
Consequently when pI increases, consumers in area r can only adjust their
demand; substitution with E is not an effective threat since this operators
price also increase (through the access charge). Consumers in u, on the
other hand can switch to E whose price is not affected. Summing up, it
appears that the uniform pricing constraint tends to decrease the first term
in the access charge expression, at least for a given level of λ.
A Appendix
A.1 Characterization of the Entrant Pricing Strategy








r, prI) are defined implicitly by the equations (7) and (8). Differentiating




































































> εY r implies εY > εY r .
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are usually assumed to be
positive (i.e. profits as a function of prices are assumed to be concave). In




















¡−∂Y rE/∂prE¢ ≤ 12
and (∂prE/∂a
r) = 1/2.More generally, if the demand Y rE (p
r
E) is a decreasing
and convex function of its price (i.e. (∂Y rE/∂p
r








0) one can show that (∂prE/∂a
r) ≥ 1/2.
A.2 Properties of the redefined demand function eY kj
The demand functions eY kj incorporate the entrant reaction and thus depend




eY uI (puI ) = Y uI [puI , puE(puI )] eY uE (puI ) = Y uE [puI , puE(puI )]eY rI (prI , ar) = Y rI [prI , prE(ar, prI)] eY rE(prI , ar) = Y rE[prI , prE(ar, prI)].


























































A.3 Proof of expressions (17)—(20)
The first -order conditions are given by:
∂Γ
∂pX





= −Y uI + (puE − c1)
∂Y uE
∂puI









[−Y uE ] (35b)
∂Γ
∂prI
= −Y rI − Y rE
∂prE
∂prI
+ (prE − ar)
∂Y rE
∂prI














+ (1 + λ)[(prI − c1)
∂Y rI
∂prE




















+ (1 + λ)Y rE. (35d)
Setting equal to zero directly yields (17) from (35a). As to the urban market,
making use of (7) which follows from profit maximization we can rearrange







































∂ eY rI /∂ar´³

















































































∂ eY rE/∂ar´+ Y rE ³∂ eY rE/∂prI´³
∂ eY rI /∂prI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂prI´







∂ eY rI /∂prI´+ Y rI ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³
∂ eY rI /∂prI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂prI´
which reduces to (19)—(20) by defining:
bσY rI Y rE = prI
³
∂ eY rI /∂prI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂prI´
−Y rI
³
∂ eY rE/∂ar´+ Y rE ³∂ eY rE/∂prI´ (38)
bσY rEY rI = ar
³
∂ eY rI /∂prI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂prI´
−Y rE
³
∂ eY rI /∂prI´+ Y rI ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´ (39)
which can also be written as:





























< σY rI ,



















































are the cross price elasticities.
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A.4 Proof of expressions (32)—( 33)




= −Y uI + (puE − c1)
∂Y uE
∂pI







− Y rI − Y rE
∂prE
∂pI
+ (prE − ar)
∂Y rE
∂pI
+ (1 + λ)[Y rI + (pI − c1)
∂ eY rI
∂pI




Note that (35d)–as well as (35a)–continue to apply, so that the pricing






































∂ eY rI /∂ar´³



































































and the solution is given by:












∂ eY rE/∂ar´+ Y rE ³∂ eY rE/∂pI´³
∂ eYI/∂pI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂pI´







∂ eYI/∂pI´+ YI ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³
∂ eYI/∂pI´³∂ eY rE/∂ar´− ³∂ eY rI /∂ar´³∂ eY rE/∂pI´
which yields simplifies to (32)—(33) by defining the superelasticities in the
usual way:













Note that to go from (41) to (42), we have used the property
³
∂ eYI/∂prE´ =³
∂ eY rI /∂prE´ which obtains because ³∂ eY uI /∂prE´ = 0. The other superelas-
ticity is defined as follows



















Remark also that bσYIY rE < σYI and that bσY rEYI < σY rE .
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